INTRODUCTION
A shareholder denotes a person who holds or owns the shares
in a company. On the other hand, a member denotes a person whose name appears
on the register of members. For all practical purposes the words �shareholder�
and 'member' are used interchangeably because under normal circumstances a
shareholder will also be a member and a member will be a shareholder.
But looked at from a close point, we may come across a few
exceptional circumstances where a shareholder may not necessarily be a member
and a member may not be a shareholder. For example
i)
Companies limited by guarantee or unlimited
companies having no share capital (without share capital) will only have
members and not shareholders.
ii)
A holder of a share warrant is a shareholder but
not a member as his name is removed from the register of members immediately on
the issue of the share warrant.
iii)
Similarly a transferee or the legal
representative of the deceased member may be a shareholder but he may not be a
member until his name is entered in the register of members.
iv)
The transferor of the deceased person is a
member so long as his name is on the register of members, whereas he cannot be
termed a shareholder.
v)
A person who has forfeited his shares ceases to
be a shareholder of the company but he remains a past member for purposes of
winding up.
However, in this chapter we will give the terms the same
treatment.
WAYS
OF BECOMING A MEMBER
There are various ways of becoming a member of a company as
discussed below;
1) By allotment
Normally a person would become a member of the company by
applying for the shares and being allotted them directly by the company.
However, it was held in
Nicol's case that the membership commences from the moment the name is
entered in the members' register. If the company wrongfully refuses to enter
the name in the register, the allottee must take rectification proceedings for
a court order directing the company to enter the name in its members' register
2) By subscribing to the memorandum
Section 10 of the Act provides that "the subscribers of
the memorandum of a company shall be deemed to have agreed to become members of
the company and on its registration, shall be entered as a member in its
register of members". Thus every subscriber to the memorandum of
association of the company becomes a member "ipso facto" on the
incorporation of the company and is liable as the holder of whatever number of
shares he has subscribed for. In the case of the subscribers of the memorandum
no allotment is necessary and no entry on the register of members is necessary
to constitute membership.
3)Agreement
to become a member and entry on the Register
In cases of membership other than
subscription to the memorandum, two essential conditions must be satisfied:
(a) An agreement to become a member and (b) Entry on the register.
These conditions are cumulative: unless they are both
satisfied the person in question has not acquired the status of membership; it
is a condition precedent to the acquisitions of such status that fie
shareholder's name should be entered on the register. Conversely, the company
is not entitled to place a person's name on the register without, is consent. A
person improperly registered without his consent is not bound thereby and may
have his name removed from the register.
4) By agreeing to take qualification
shares
All persons who have signed an undertaking for their
qualification shares, for acting as a director of the company and delivered to
the registrar of companies are also in the same position as subscribers to the
memorandum. As such, they are also deemed to have become members automatically on
the registration of the company.
N/B This method is only possible in public companies
with/having a share capital or private company.
5) By transfer
A person also gets registered as a member if he buys the
shares in the open market. This is possible in the case of a contract of sale
or other transaction. There is no difference between a contract to take shares
and any other contract. A formal contract is not necessary.
A transferee also acquires his membership by virtue of
sub�section 2 of s.28, being a person who has agreed to become a member. The
principle in Nicol�s case applies to
transferees as well, and a transferee becomes a member from the moment his name
is entered in the register of members.
6)
By transmission
A person may become a shareholder by transmission of shares
through death, lunacy or insolvency of a member. Transmission is different from
transfer in that it is an involuntary transfer. It takes place by operation of
law to a person who is entitled under the law to succeed to the shares of the
deceased or lunatic automatically and does not require an instrument of
transfer. Here, the company is not entitled without his consent to place the
name of the person who may become the shareholder in consequence or by reason
of the death or bankruptcy of member or any other event constituting
transmission on the register of members.
7) By estoppels
If a person's name is improperly placed on the register and
he knows and assents to it, attends company meetings, accepts a dividend, he
shall be deemed to be a member. Under this principle if a person holds himself
out as being in a position of membership, which is not true, he will be
estopped from denying that he is a member.
8) Transmission on bankruptcy of Member
A bankrupt member's shares in a company will be transmitted
to his trustee in bankruptcy according to the principles of bankruptcy law. The
company's articles may give the trustee an option of being personally
registered as a member, as is provided for by Table A, Article 30. If the trustee
elects or decides to be registered as the holder of the shares the election
constitutes the agreement to be a member and the provisions of sub�section 2 of
s.28 become applicable�ie. the trustee in bankruptcy will become a member from
the moment his name is entered in the register of members.
9)
Compliance with s.182 (2)
A person who has consented to be a director, and has given
the statutory undertaking to take and pay for his qualification shares, is
declared by s.182(2) to be, "in the same position as if he had signed the
memorandum."
The provisions of s.28 (1) accordingly apply to him, and he
becomes a member of the company at the moment the memorandum of association is
registered.
Member
and Shareholder
In companies having a
share capital, a shareholder is also a member of the company. In companies, not
having a share capital, there are members but no share� holders. "The
terms 'member' and 'shareholder' are synonymous, apart from the now exceptional
case of the bearer of a share warrant who is shareholder but is not a member
because he is not registered in the register of members."
The words, "member," "shareholder", and
"holder of a share" have been used interchangeably in the Companies
Act. The expression, "holder of a share" denotes, in so far as the
company is concerned, only a person who, as a shareholder, has his name entered
in the register of members.
Who
May Become A Member?
All persons who are competent to contract may in general
become members of a company. There are however some special considerations to
the following:
1. Company as member of company
A company may become a member of
another company.The authorization would be made by a resolution of its
directors or other governing body under s.139(1)(a).
Section 29(1) provides that a body corporate cannot be a
member of a company, which is its holding company. Any allotment or transfer of
shares in a company to its subsidiary shall be void except�
Where the subsidiary is concerned as personal representative
or trustee, unless the holding company or its subsidiary is beneficially
interested under the trust and is not so interested only by way of security for
the purposes of a transaction entered into by it is in the ordinary course of
business which includes the lending of money.
This somewhat lengthy provision may be explained with the
aid of some examples.
i. M, who is a member of Z Bank Ltd, appoints its subsidiary, Z
Bank (Executor & Trustee) Ltd, as his executor. On M's death, the
subsidiary may be registered as a member of the holding company in respect of M
shares. ii. M transfers his shares to the subsidiary (in the above example)
on trust for a beneficiary B, who borrows money from the holding company and
secures repayment by mortgaging his interest in the shares to the company.
Where the subsidiary was a member of the holding company at
the commencement of the Act on 1st January, 1962. Such a member would have no
right to vote at meetings of the holding company or any class of members
thereof except in respect of shares it holds as personal representative or
trustee..
2. A Firm
A partnership firm cannot become a member of a company, as
it is not a legal person having a separate entity from that of partners.
Partners may be registered as joint holders in which case each of them becomes
a member. A company may however be a partner in a firm.
3. Minor
An infant is any person who has not attained the age of 18
years (the Age of Majority Act 1974). He has a common law right to enter into a
contract to buy shares in a company, and thereby become a member of the
company. The contract is however voidable at his option, and he may avoid it at
any time during his infancy or within a reasonable time after attaining the age
of 18 years. A transfer to a minor is good provided that the company registers
the transfer, which it has power to refuse. Until repudiation either by the
company or the minor he has the full powers of membership.
However, it was
explained in Steinberg v Scala (Leeds)
Ltd that although the infant has a right to repudiate the contract he would
only be entitled to get back the amount already paid if there has been a total
failure of consideration because the shares have become valueless. In this
case, Miss Steinberg, an infant, purchase 500 �1 shares from the defendant
company. She paid 10 shillings on each
share and, being unable to meet some calls, repudiated the contract while she
was still a minor and claimed
(a) rectification of the register of members
to remove her name therefrom, and thereby relieve her from liability on future
calls; and (b) recovery of the money already paid.
The court held that:
(a) She
was entitled to rescind and so was not liable for future calls, but
(b) She
was not entitled to recover the money already paid because there had not been a
total failure of consideration. She had
got the thing for which the money was paid, namely, the shares. Although she had not yet received any
dividends on the shares, the shares had some value.
A company's articles may however restrict membership of the
company to adults only, in which case an infant would not become a member of
the company.
4. Bankrupt
A bankrupt individualmay be a member of a company; as long
as he is on the register of members, he
is entitled to vote and to make use of the right of a minority shareholder.
5. Foreigners
A foreigner can be a shareholder, but in times of war (where
he becomes an alien enemy) his powers of
voting and his right to receive notice
is suspended.
6. Personal Representatives
On a shareholder's death, ownership of the shares previously
held by him is transmitted to his personal representative, who may be an
executor or administrator. The personal representative would be entitled to be
registered as a member of the company unless the company's articles provide
otherwise.
7. A
person upon whom shares have devolved pursuant to the Provisions of Bankruptcy
Act, may become a member of the company
Legal
protection of Minors
According to decisions of English courts, companies are
democratic organisations whose affairs are to be managed by the directors
according to the provisions of the Companies Act, the company's memorandum and
articles of association and, where a decision of the members is required,
according to the decision of the majority of the company's members expressed as
an ordinary or special resolution. The
minority of members who have been outvoted during the passing of the relevant
resolution must be prepared to abide by the decision of the majority of the
company's members.
There are however a few but significant instances in which
the Companies Act and the general law prescribe certain legal limits on the
power of the majority to bind the minority of the company's members. In particular, a resolution passed by the
majority would not be allowed to prevail in certain circumstances if it is
unfair or prejudicial to the minority, such as a resolution which �
i)
requires a member to take or subscribe for more
shares than the number held by him at the date on which the resolution was
passed
ii)
alters the company's objects;
iii) reduces
the company's capital in a way which is not "fair and equitable"
between the different classes of shareholders;
iv)
empowers the company to embark on or continue
with, a course of trading which was not contemplated by the minority at the
time the company was being formed (in which case the court would be prepared to
make an order for the winding up of the company on the ground that it is
"just and equitable" to do so); or
v)
constitutes "a fraud on the minority".
Statutory
Provisions
Variation
of Class Rights
Article 4 of Table A permits a company to vary the rights
attached to any class of shares if the proposed variation is consented to in
writing by the holders of three�fourths of the issued shares of that class or
is sanctioned by a special resolution passed at a separate general meeting of
the holders of the shares of the class.
The purpose of this article is to protect the minority
members in a company against the majority members in the company by ensuring that
they do not hold a joint meeting in which the majority class could pass a
resolution for variation of the minority's rights despite their
opposition. Such a resolution would not
be a fair one as it would effectively enable the majority forcibly to modify or
appropriate to themselves some rights of the minority. However, the fundamental flaw in the article
is its failure to make provision for the protection of the minority members in
the minority class. This omission has
been compensated for by Section 74 of the Act which entitles the holders of not
less in the aggregate than fifteen per cent of the issued shares of the class
being varied to apply to the court to have the variation cancelled, provided
that they did not consent to or vote in favour of the resolution for the
variation.
Where any application is made pursuant to this provision,
the variation shall not have effect unless and until it is confirmed by the
court.
An application under the section must be made by petition
within thirty days after the date on which the consent was given or the
resolution was passed. It may be made on
behalf of the applicants by such one or more of their number as they may
appoint in writing for the purpose.
Section 74(3) provides that on any such application the
court, after hearing the applicant and any other persons who apply to the court
to be heard and appear to the court to be interested in the application, may
disallow the variation if it is satisfied, having regard to all the
circumstances of the case, that the variation would unfairly prejudice the
shareholders of the class represented by the applicant.
The following are some of the relevant English cases.
(a) Re Holders Investment Trust Ltd (1979)
The company proposed to reduce its share capital by repayment
of the 5% 1 pound Cumulative Preference Shares (which were entitled to
repayment of capital in priority to ordinary shares) and to effect repayment by the allotment to
the holders an equivalent amount of 6% unsecured loan stock, repayable
1985/90. The trustees of trusts which
held 90% of the issued preference shares voted at a class meeting in favour of
the scheme because they had been advised that as holders of 52% of the
company's ordinary stock and non�voting ordinary shares they would derive overall
benefit from the change.
The court held that the resolution passed at the class
meeting was invalid since the trustees who provided the majority of votes cast
were not concerned with benefit to holders of the preference shares as a
class. They had instead considered what
was best in their own interests, based on their large holding of stock and
ordinary shares. Although this case came
to the court for approval of the reduction of share capital and not as an objection
to variation of class rights, it is in fact the leading case on the principles
which the court will apply in dealing with the objection to a variation of
class rights approved by a majority of the class.
(b) Carruth vs. I.C.I. Ltd (1973)
There was a sequence of general and class meetings to approve
the successive stages of a capital re�organisation. Out of 1,600 members present only 565 were
holders of deferred shares. But only the
holders of shares of each class were invited to vote (as a class) at their
class meeting. The others present took
no part.
The court held that there was no irregularity of procedure
in conducting a class meeting in the presence of non�members of the class. A class meeting is one at which only members
of a particular class vote. It does not
matter that others who are not members of the class are present.
It is only necessary to follow the variation of class rights
procedure (and a dissenting minority can only apply to the court for
cancellation) if what is proposed amounts to a variation of the class, right of
itself. It is not a variation of class
rights:
(a)
to issue shares of the same class to allottees
who are not already members of the class (unless the defined class rights
prohibit this); In White vs. Bristol
Aeroplane Co the company made a bonus issue of new ordinary and preference
shares to the existing ordinary shareholders who alone were entitled under the
article to participate in bonus issues.
The existing preference shareholders objected that by reducing their proportion
of the class of preference shares the bonus issue was a variation of class
rights to which they had not consented. The court held that this was not
variation of class rights since the existing preference shareholders had the
same number of shares (and votes at a class meeting) as before.
(b)
to subdivide shares of another class with the
incidental effect of increasing the voting strength of that other class. In Greenhalgh vs . Arderne Cinemas case
the company had two classes of ordinary shares, i.e. 50p shares and 10p
shares. Every share carried one
vote. A resolution was passed to
subdivide each 50p share into five 10p shares, thus multiplying the votes of
that class by five. The court held that the rights of the original 10p shares
had not been varied since they still had one vote per share as before.
(c) to
return capital to the holders of preference shares which carry no right on a
winding up to share in surplus assets but merely a right to prior repayment. In
the Re Saltdean Estate Co. Ltd case
a company had ordinary shares and preference shares. The preference shareholders were entitled to
the prior return of capital on a winding up but nothing more. The company proposed to repay the preference
shareholders with the court sanction and return their capital to them so that
the class of preference shareholders would be eliminated.
The court held that this was not
a variation of class rights of the preference shareholders. The company could resolve to go into
liquidation at any time and the preference shareholders would then only receive
a return of capital and this they had been given.
(d) to
create and issue a new class of preference shares with priority over an
existing class of preference shares. In Underwood
v. London Music Hall case by analogy an improvement in the rights of
existing preference shares, e.g. by raising the rate of preference dividend
from, say, 6% to 8%, is not a variation of the rights of ordinary shareholders
although it diminishes the residual profits available for distribution to the
latter as ordinary dividends.
The cases cited in (a) to (d) illustrate the principle that
without a "literal variation" of a class right (as defined by the
memorandum or articles) there is no alteration of rights to which the
safeguards of the variation of rights clause (e.g. Table A, Article 4)
apply. Dr. Rice contends that the
instances constitute a variation of the enjoyment of the class rights rather
than a variation of class right itself.
In the Bristol
Aeroplane case it was said of the issue of additional preference shares
that:
"the existing preference shareholders will be in a less
advantageous position on such occasions as entitle them to register their votes
whether at a general meeting of the company or at separate meetings of their
own class. But there is to my mind a
distinction, and a sensible distinction, between an affecting of the rights and
an affecting of ... the capacity to turn them to account".
It is a sensible or practical distinction because many
decisions taken in the course of the company's business might affect the value
of the shareholders' rights. For example, suppose that a company has two
businesses: one is a dependable source of profits sufficient to provide for the
preference dividend but those profits are a poor return on capital employed. The directors then decide to sell that
business at a high price in order to reinvest the proceeds in expanding the
company's other business which offers prospects of long�term capital growth but
very little immediate profit. The position
of preference shareholders would be affected since there may no longer be
sufficient profits to cover their dividend.
But it would not be appropriate that they should have a veto (under
variation of rights procedure) or an opportunity to apply to the court for a
veto on what is essentially a question of commercial strategy. It would probably be better to limit the
constraint of variation of rights procedure to clear�cut and direct alteration
of class rights, e.g. a reduction in the rate of preference dividend from, say,
8% to 6%.
In making this approach the courts have nonetheless kept the
door open for action to deal with discrimination against a class by indirect
means. In the Bristol Aeroplanecase it was said (as an obiter dictum) that if the
ordinary shareholders had passed a resolution simply to double the votes
attached to the ordinary shares this would have been a variation of the voting
rights of preference shares (to which the safeguards described above would
apply).
A class of shares may carry different rights in one respect
(e.g. a preference dividend) but the same rights as other classes in other
respects. Because of the difference it
ranks as a class to which the safeguards apply.
This is so even when the class right to be varied is shared with the
other class. Suppose, for example, the
articles give one vote per share to both ordinary and preference shares. A proposal to reduce the votes of preference
shares to, say, 1 vote for 10 preference shares is a variation of a class right
since it is enjoyed by that class (and also by the ordinary shareholders).
Section 74(4) provides that the decision of the court on any
application shall be final. The company must deliver a certified copy of the
court order to the registrar within thirty days after the making of the order.
Oppression
of Minorities
Section 211 of the Act provides
that any member of a company who complains that the affairs of the company are
being conducted in a manner oppressive to some part of the members, including
himself, may make an order under the section.
The court is empowered to make such order as it thinks fit with a view
to bringing to an end the matters complained of if, on any such petition, it is
of the opinion that:
a)
the company's affairs are being conducted as
alleged by the applicant, and
b) to
wind up the company would unfairly prejudice the applicants but the proved
facts would have justified the company's winding up on the "just and
equitable" grounds.
An order made by the court may�
a)
regulate the conduct of the company's affairs in
future
b)
Order the purchase of some members shares by
other members,
c) order
the purchase of some members' shares by the company itself and a consequent
reduction of the company's capital.
Meaning
of "Oppression"
The Section does not define the word "oppression" or
what constitutes "oppressive conduct". However, the Cohen Committee's Report (1947)
gave the following as examples of oppressive conduct envisaged by the Section.
(a)
Where controlling directors unreasonably refuse
to register transfers of the minority holdings so as to force a sale to
themselves at a low price.
(b) Where
the controlling directors take excessive remuneration so as to leave virtually
nothing for distribution by way of dividend.
To these, the Jenkins Committee added the following:
(a)
The issue of shares to directors and others on
advantageous terms.
(b) The
passing of non�cumulative preference dividends on shares held by the minority.
In Scottish
Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer (1958) Lord Denning observed
that "the section gives a large discretion to the court" which would
be "well exercised in making an oppressor make compensation to those who
have suffered at his hands.
In Re H.R. Harmer Ltd
(1959) Jenkins, L.J. stated:
"Prima facie, therefore, the word `oppressive' must be
given its ordinary sense"
Conditions
for Relief
In H.R. Harmer Ltd
(1959) Jenkins L.J. summarised the conditions which must be met before relief
under the section can be granted by the court when he stated that:
(1) The
oppression complained of must be complained of by a member of the company and
must be oppression to some part of the members (including himself) in their or
his capacity as a member or members of the company as such.
(2) The
facts of the case must not only be those that would justify the making of a winding�up
order under the `just and equitable' rule but must also be of a character which
have in them the requisite element of oppression
(3) The
phrase "the affairs of the company are being conducted" suggests
prima facie a continuing process and is wide enough to cover oppression by
anyone who is taking part in the conduct of the affairs of the company whether
de facto or de jare.
(4) The
word "oppressive" must be given its ordinary sense and the question
must be whether in that sense the conduct complained of is oppressive to a
member or members as such. The strict
application of these conditions by the English courts rendered the section
largely ineffective as a minority protection section and culminated in its
repeal by the English Companies Art 1980.
Only the following cases had been successfully brought under
the section�
(i)Re. H.R. Harmer Ltd(1947):� Harmer senior ('the father') formed a private company to take over the stamp�dealing business which he had founded many years earlier; and although as a result of a succession of gifts and purchases the majority of shares in the company were now owned by his sons, the father retained his voting control. The father and sons were appointed life directors by the articles of association, which also constituted the father 'governing director'� an office not defined as carrying any distinctive powers. The sons petitioned for relief under s.210, alleging that th